There are significant moments in every nation’s history.  They remain in public memory and in cultural references for a long time.  Most of these significant moments are also moments that change the course of things and redefine the future that follows.  9/11 for the US is an obvious example.  Susurluk car accident, hooding of Turkish soldiers by the Americans in Northern Iraq, the 1999 Golcuk earthquake are but a few recent Turkish examples.  Will the two bombs that exploded at a peace rally in the middle of the capital city Ankara, claiming more than 100 lives, be another of these significant moments?

Bombs blasted even before the rally had even begun, people chanting and dancing a moment before the blasts were lying lifeless or in pain drenched in blood afterwards.  The lives were lost, nothing can change that.  We can make sure that they were not lost in vain, we can take the lessons we need to learn.  We don’t know much detail about what exactly happened and who the perpetrators were.  The government declared that ISIS operatives were responsible, but did not release any details.  Even despite the lack of transparency and government attempts at hiding things behind a fog screen, we know enough to take our lessons.

So, what have we learned from the twin blasts in Ankara on 10/10/2015

1.Turkish state is either unable or unwilling to prevent ISIS operatives explode bombs in the heart of its capital city.  One may say: “Well, American government could not stop the Boston marathon bombers!”  It’s not the same, though.  If you’ve ever been to Taksim square or Galatasaray you’d know it’s not the same.  Turkish police has always been very present at even the tiniest gathering of people.  I remember seeing more policemen than protestors at a small press release at Galatasaray.  At a big rally organized by opposition political groups, the whole place should have been swarming with the police.  Their MO is to expect trouble and intervene.  They missed the bombers either willingly or unwillingly, either is a big failure.  But to their defense(!), they did gas the shocked/wounded people after the bombings, they did prevent the ambulance get to the area, and they did wash away any evidence with their water cannons. Kudos on a job well done!

2. The AKP government has been using its media and social media arms to blame the HDP (pro-Kurdish party that had a strong showing and prevented an AKP supermajority by its presence in the parliament in the June 7 elections).  There are many AKP supporters on social media who still believe or claim that HDP did plan the explosions and the deaths to gain sympathy and votes in the upcoming (early/repeat) elections. Portrayal of HDP as a party so hungry for political power that it would kill its own supporters was intentional (and sadly it worked to some extent).  There is a fundamental mistake in this logic:  The rally was not a HDP electoral rally.  It was organized many left leaning civil society organizations, such as professional associations of engineers, doctors, or teachers. They definitely overlap with the HDP supporters and HDP did support the rally; but it was not a HDP rally.

This intentional propaganda was obviously undertaken to influence HDP votes in the upcoming elections in November.  In June 2015, many people who would not vote for the pro-Kurdish HDP under “normal” circumstances voted for the party just to nudge it over the 10% electoral threshold.  They voted to prevent a big AKP majority in the parliament and it worked.  Everybody is pretty cognizant of these “borrowed votes.”  Since June, AKP is trying to make nationalist feelings of Turkish people more salient so they won’t think of “lending” their votes to HDP again.  Hence, the AKP propaganda “It was a HDP rally and they are so desperate, they bombed their own rally.”

3. The society in Turkey is now divided beyond repair. A lot of people just assumed that the people who died were Kurds and they automatically deduced that they were PKK supporters.  Given the renewed bout of violence in the Southeast and the surge in the number of military/police deaths since the June 7 elections, the opinions and feelings towards the Kurds have been tainted with blood.  These people definitely don’t feel sad about the human loss.  Quite the contrary, there are some who express content, there are some who feel vindicated for the military/police deaths of recent, there are those who oppose any official recognition of these deaths such as a national day of mourning.  Is it possible to unite people under a flag if some cannot feel sadness over the loss of HUMAN life, just because the dead was one of “them”?  Divided nations can survive but can a nation exist without ANY sympathy or empathy?  Sadly, AKP’s post-June discourse is targeting exactly these people and it is building its discourse on deepening these fault lines.  It is not a winning strategy, AKP itself knows that the winning strategy was its embracing strategy of early 2000s.  AKP is well past defensive; since June it is in survival mode.  The consequences of a survival mode operation is to be feared; short horizons call for high risk and anarchy.  AKP is no longer a stationary bandit but a roving bandit of a government (a la Mancur Olson).

4. The Syria situation is a mess, it is out of control, and Turkey is suffering from it .  Putin’s Russia is bombing Syria, Americans are bombing their own targets, Assad is still in power, millions of Syrians are suffering and dying as refugees, ISIS is gaining ground each day.  Turkish government and intelligence have their own scandalous role in this mess, but they have lost any control they had over their Syrian clients.  The bombings in Diyarbakir and Suruc this summer, both targeting pro-Kurdish groups/party were ISIS’s doing, so is Ankara it is declared.  We don’t (and probably never will) know whether these were ISIS breaking bad or ISIS doing the dirty work of the MIT (Turkish intelligence) but either way the government is responsible for failing to control/contain/prevent the operatives or for giving them a green light.

Syrians themselves obviously have suffered most from this huge vacuum of power, security and stability.  Beyond Syrians, Turkey is (and will be) to suffer most.  Especially with Russia’s direct involvement, the situation is well beyond Turkish government’s control or direction.  They *may* have some influence through shuttle diplomacy, but not more than influence.  When you have such instability and violence across your borders it will either spread into your borders or it will cause a “rally behind the flag” effect.  AKPs electoral strategies explicitly ban/refuse many sectors of the society (especially Kurds and Alevis) from rallying behind the flag; what’s the remaining option?

5.  Turkey has never really been democratic, but it was a hopeful case; current status of Turkish democracy: cardiac arrest.  The lack of democracy means the lack of democratic institutions, such as an independent judiciary and accountable governments.  If Diyarbakir and Suruc bombings were effectively investigated, maybe Ankara could be prevented.  After each case, the government wows to bring the responsible to justice and everything is forgotten soon after.  We’re at a point where the public isn’t even expecting and demanding an impartial judicial investigation of the case, we have normalized the expectation that it won’t happen.  Can a democracy survive when its people don’t expect and demand it?

Turkish democracy is in cardiac arrest. Sometimes the spirit of Gezi or civic organizations like Oy ve Otesi (Votes and Beyond/electoral monitoring) breathe life into it.  A shock on June 7 couldn’t revive it, and November elections will likely be the last chance.  Turkish democracy is dying and the blood in the streets of Ankara is oozing out of its wounds.